The Wind in His Fists

What if our current scientific view is all wrong?  It’s happened before.  James Clerk Maxwell once wrote that “the ether was the best confirmed entity in the whole of physical theory (Polkinghorne, John.  Quantum Theory: A Very Short Introduction, p. 4)”. 

In fact, there is no assurance that science provides an accurate picture of reality at all, or that it “progresses” toward a clearer and clearer picture of “reality”.  Science works from within the prevailing paradigm of the day, a paradigm that dictates the questions that are allowed to be asked, and the methods used for solving them (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).  The progress of science toward clearer and clearer pictures of reality is an illusion created by the fact that the scientific community believes this.  The scientific community perceives itself as ever progressing toward the “truth”, and so whenever changes in methodology or theory become accepted by the community, they are seen as progress. 

If, for example, I accept quantum mechanics as the only way to find truth about atoms and sub-atomic particles, then anywhere the quantum mechanical method seems to be leading will appear as progress.  QM will delimit the scope of inquiry, identify the problems to be solved, and dictate the methods acceptable for solving them.  When QM successfully solves such problems, “progress” occurs.   When QM overcame classical mechanics, it appeared to be progress because it opened up a broad new area of inquiry, and addressed problems that were outside the scope of classical mechanics.  The illusion was strengthened by the fact that it could be made to fit with the now defunct, but still useful, classical theory.   QM “works” not because it is closer to the truth, but because it is a package, complete with its own problems to be solved.  And don’t forget, the Ptolomeic system of astronomy worked as well as the Copernican (Polanyi, Personal Knowledge), even the phlogiston theory of combustion worked well for many applications. 

And as far as “working” is concerned, that really has more to do with the engineers than the scientific theory.   I don’t think it was physicists who got us to the moon, but engineers.  If scientists are involved in such processes, such as the Manhattan project, then they are doing engineering, not science.  They develop equations and methods that work, regardless of how “true” they are.

So, it is quite possible that our current scientific understanding is all wrong, and this includes our understanding of evolution and the history of the earth.  The truth may entail a very different paradigm.

There is evidence on both sides, but it seems that all of the evidence for Christianity can be “explained away” with alternative, naturalistic explanations.   At least, it seems that whenever Christians think they have found something that cannot be explained by science, science eventually finds an alternative explanation.  When this happens, it seems to negate the evidence for Christianity.  Why?

Do we have a natural preference for naturalistic (naturalism: the view of the world that takes account only of natural elements and forces, excluding the supernatural or spiritual (dictionary.com)) explanations?  It seems clear that we approach the evidence with naturalistic presuppositions.  Is this justified?  Why do we have a preference for what we can see, hear, and touch? 

But that’s not even it.  Most scientific explanations are not like that: we can’t see, feel, or touch quantum mechanics or relativity.  Sure, we can test them, but we initially believed them with very little evidence.  And what about multiverse theory?  It has become very popular among physicists, but it can never be tested.  Why is this explanation preferable to God?  I suppose it is still in terms of things I can see, universes and such.  I can see this universe (though not the whole thing) and it is reasonable that there may be more.

But it is deeper than this.  I can’t see gravity.  What is “natural” is not what I can see, but rather what predictable, and regular.

But not quantum mechanics.  It is not “predictable” in the strict sense.  But is is testable.  It can be touched, seen, and felt,  though indirectly.  Evolution is like this as well:  it can only be tested indirectly–we see fossils, use radioactivity to estimate ages, compare DNA sequences.  So is the big bang.  So are most things in modern science.

So is Christianity.  It can be tested indirectly.  God can be felt, seen, and heard indirectly.

So why the preference?

It almost seems that the “natural” is best defined as “anti-supernatural”.  We prefer explanations that do not invoke a personality behind the universe, only impersonal objects and forces acting of their own accord.  Why is this?

Science involves faith.   How so?  Well, in order to “know” anything, we must make a subjective “leap of faith.”  I think this was established by Kierkegaard (see my post, “Musing with Kierkegaard), but I also think it would be appropriate to delve a bit more deeply into the subject.   Why is there a need for faith in science?  We have already seen what S.K. had to say.  let’s look at another influential philosopher:  Michael Polanyi.

In his book “Personal knowledge:  Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy”, Polanyi disassembles the view that we can build a complete picture of the world through objective observation and empirical investigation.  His work was decisive, and closely related to the idea of faith, as you will see.  Before I get into his arguments, a couple of definitions may be in order.  For the purposes of this post, objective means”not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased (dictionary.com)”.  Subjective means “existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought (dictionary.com)”.   A subject is “that which thinks, feels, perceives, intends, etc., as contrasted with the objects of thought, feeling, etc. (dictionary.com)”.

Polanyi points to several lines of evidence that suggest that it is impossible for science to be totally objective, rather it is impossible to remove the subjective elements.  First, he points out that scientists do not accept theories solely on the basis of how well they fit the evidence.  The Ptolemaic system worked as well as the Copernican system, but was rejected because subjective factors attracted people to the Copernican way.   Likewise, scientists ignored Miller’s contradiction of the Michelson-Morely Experiment, not on objective grounds, but based on a subjective preference for Einstein’s theory:  its “rationality”.  We cannot replace this subjective element with ideas like “simplicity”, notes Polanyi.  “Simplicity” is a smoke screen so we don’t have to acknowledge the subjective element.  Is Quantum Mechanics simple?

Secondly, he discusses the concept of probability.  He notes that “supposedly science aims to produce a complete intellectual control over experience in terms of precise rules which can be formally set out and empirically tested… we would be relieved of personal judgement.”  This, however, is impossible.   He starts with the closest science has come to this ideal:  classical mechanics.  Classical mechanics can supposedly predict the future, but input data are not the facts of experience, but rather readings or measurements with associated random error and skill-related systematic error. 

How these errors are dealt with or interpreted is a matter of personal judgement.  They may be called anomalies, as were certain irregularities in the orbits of the planets before the discovery of Neptune.  They may, of course, be dealt with by applying some sort of rule, and this rule is a matter of personal judgement.  Statistics is a method of dealing with these uncertainties in a systematic way, in an effort to increase objectivity.  But the statistical limits are matters of personal judgement.  For example, will we accept the hypothesis if there is 5% uncertainty?  How about 10%?  Even the procedures we use to calculate the uncertainties are based on methods and criteria developed using personal judgement.   We compare the difference between two means with the range of accidental variations which appear to occur in our sample, and the means will be accepted as truly different only if the difference exceeds the range of natural variation.  But the “range of natural variation” that is used as a criteria must be selected using personal judgement.  Perhaps it is not my judgement, maybe I use someone else’s value, but it is judgement nonetheless.  And what about the “natural range of variation”?  Where did it come from?  From observations and experiments made by people whose methods were chosen using their personal judgement.

In order to communicate this idea to my students, I pass around a graduated beaker of water and have each student write down their measurement of how much water is in the beaker.  I write all of their measurements on the board:  they typically vary by more than ten milliliters.  Then I ask them “How much water is in the beaker?” 

The truth is we can never know with 100% certainty.  The best we can do is say something like, “52 plus or minus 2 mL.”  That is better, but even the plus or minus 2 is not totally objective.  How did we get that value?  Is it the range?  The average uncertainty?  The standard deviation?  Now, this value, the volume of water in the beaker is supposedly an objective observation, a “fact”, but do we “know” how much water is in the beaker?  Do we even know that it is within a our cited range?  Yet this value, this volume, may be used to formulate or test a theory.  All theories are tested with observations that include elements of personal bias and judgement.  In addition, theories are evaluated on the basis of subjective elements, as described above.  We simply cannot remove these subjective influences from science.

A closely related phenomena is the way in which we discern order in the midst of randomness.  Polanyi uses, as an illustration, the words “Welcome to Wales” written with pebbles on a hillside.  Imagine the arrangement of pebbles becoming more and more disordered.  At what point do we cease to recognize it as an ordered arrangement, different from randomness?  This is a subjective judgement.  the example I give my students is similar:  if I look up into the sky and see a line of three stars, I do not doubt that their alignment is due to random chance.  But if I look up and see ten stars in a line, or 25, that is a different story. But how do I draw the line? Only with personal judgement. 

This is analogous to a linear regression.  Are two sets of observations related or not?  When we do a linear regression we use pre-selected rules to decide for us when we have a linear relationship and when we don’t.  But, of course, we choose the criteria.  We choose the rule.  What is the minimum r-squared value we will accept?

In fact, all observations involve this kind of separation of the observation from background noise, and so all observations involve this kind of subjective judgement.

Lastly, Polanyi treats the idea of skills.  “Skills cannot be accounted for in terms iof their particulars.”  We swim without being able to say how.  Scientific measurements and observations involve skills.   Some of these skills are passed down from generation to generation of scientist.   Our measurements and observations are inextricably tied to the skills and tools we use to get them.  This is painfully obvious to high school chemistry teacher.  The measurements my students get and the measurements I get are often vastly different.  They are colored by this fourth subjective element.

So, what does any of this have to do with faith?  Polanyi was concerned with how to “achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I believe to be true, even though I know that it may conceivably be false.”  Sounds like faith to me.  I must admit I have not gotten all of the way through the book yet.  I’m not sure how he resolves the issues that I outlined above.  But here is how I resolve them. 

For one thing, his arguments  imply that we cannot know anything from science with 100% certainty.  Thus, to “believe” any theory or interpretation must involve a leap.  In my mind, Polanyi has demonstrated that we can “know” nothing through science without a subjective “judgement”.  This judgement is the only way to bridge the gap between uncertainty and certainty.  It is a leap.  It is not a groundless, completely irrational leap, of course.  But then, neither is the Christian faith.

I am not claiming that it is identical to Christian faith, only that it is a kind of “faith”.

Of course, I’m not sure we needed Polanyi’s treatment.  Kierkegaard did a fine job when he spoke of “the system (see “Musing…”)”.